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Abstract
In this paper, we develop an account of the kind
of deliberation that an agent that is doing plan-
ning or executing high-level programs under in-
complete information must be able to perform.
The deliberator’s job is to produce a kind of plan
that does not itself require deliberation to inter-
pret. We characterize these as epistemically fea-
sible programs: programs for which the execut-
ing agent, at every stage of execution, by virtue
of what it knew initiallyand the subsequentread-
ings of its sensors, always knows what step to
take next towards the goal of completing the en-
tire program. We formalize this notion and char-
acterize deliberation in the IndiGolog agent lan-
guageintermsofit. We alsoshowthatforcertain
classes of problems, which correspond to con-
formant planning and conditional planning, the
searchfor epistemicallyfeasibleprogramscanbe
limited to programs of a simple syntactic form.
We also discuss implementation issues and exe-
cution monitoring and replanning.
1 INTRODUCTION
Whilealargeamountofwork on planningdealswith issues
of efﬁciency, a number of representational questions re-
main. This is especially true in applications where because
of limitationson the informationavailableat plan time, and
quite apart from computational concerns, no straight-line
plan (that is, no linear sequence of actions) can be demon-
stratedto achievea goal. Inverymanycases, itisnecessary
to supplement what is known at plan time by information
that can only be obtained at run time via sensing.
In cases like these, what should we expect a planner to do
given a goal? We cannot expect it to return a straight-line
plan. We could get it to return a more general program
of some sort, but we need to be careful: if the program is
general enough, it may be as challenging to ﬁgure out how
to execute it as it was to achieve the goal in the ﬁrst place.
This is certainly true for programs in the Golog family of
high-level programming languages [Levesque et al., 1997,
De Giacomo et al., 2000, Reiter, 2001a]. Those logic lan-
guages offer an interesting alternative to planning in which
theuserspeciﬁesnotjustagoal,butalsoconstraintsonhow
it is to be achieved, perhaps leaving small sub-tasks to be
handled by an automatic planner. In that way, a high-level
program serves as a “guide” heavily restricting the search
space. Bya high-levelprogram, wemeanonewhoseprimi-
tiveinstructionsare domain-dependentactionsofthe robot,
whose tests involve domain-dependent ﬂuents affected by
these actions, and whose code may contain nondeterminis-
tic choice points. Instead of looking for a legal sequence
of actions achieving some goal, the (planning) task now is
to ﬁnd a sequence that constitutes a legal execution of a
high-level program.
At its most basic, planning should be a form of deliber-
ation, whose purpose is to produce a speciﬁcation of the
desired behavior, a speciﬁcation which should not itself re-
quire deliberation to interpret. In [Levesque, 1996] it was
suggested that a planner’s job was to return a robot pro-
gram, a syntactically-deﬁned structure that a robot could
follow while consulting its sensors to determine a condi-
tional course of action. Other forms of conditional plans
havebeenproposed,for example,in[PeotandSmith,1992,
Smith et al., 1998, Lakemeyer, 1999]. What these all have
in common, is that they deﬁne plans as syntactically re-
stricted programs.
In this paper, we consider a different and more abstract
version of plans. We propose to treat plans as epistemi-
cally feasible programs: programs for which the executing
agent, at everystage of execution,by virtueof what it knew
initially and the subsequent readings of its sensors, always
knows what step to take next towards the goal of complet-
ing the entire program.This paper will not present algorithms for generating epis-
temically feasible programs. What we will do, however,
is characterize the notion formally, prove that certain cases
of syntactically restricted programs are epistemicallyfeasi-
ble, and that in some cases where there is an epistemically
feasible program, a syntactically restricted one that has the
same outcome can also be derived.
To make these concepts precise, it is useful to consider a
framework where we can talk about the planning and ex-
ecution of very general agent programs involving sensing
and acting. IndiGolog [De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999a]
is a variant of Golog intended to be executed online in an
incremental way. Because of this incremental style execu-
tion, an agent program is capable of gathering new infor-
mation from the world during its execution. Most relevant
for our purposes is that IndiGolog includes a search op-
erator which allows it to only take a step if it can convince
itself that the step will allow it to eventuallycomplete some
user-speciﬁed subprogram. In that way, IndiGolog pro-
vides an attractive integrated account of sensing, planning,
and action. However, IndiGolog search does not guarantee
that it will not get stuck in a situation where it knows that
some step can be performed, but does not know which. It
is this search operator that we will generalize here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in Sec-
tion 2 we set the stage by presenting the situation calculus
and high-level programs based on it. In Section 3, since
we are going to make a speciﬁc use of the knowledge op-
erator for characterizing the program returned by the delib-
erator, we introduce epistemically accurate theories and a
basic property they have w.r.t. reasoning. In Section 4, we
characterize epistemically feasible deterministic programs,
i.e., the kind of program that we consider suitable results
of the deliberation process, and in Section 5, we study two
notable subclasses of epistemically feasible deterministic
programs,that can be characterizedinterms of syntaxonly.
In Section 6 we discuss how some of the abstract notions
we have introduced can be readily implemented in prac-
tice. In Section 7, we discuss how the deliberated program
could be monitored and revised if circumstances require it.
Finally, in Section 8, we draw conclusions and discuss fu-
ture and related work.
2 THE SITUATION CALCULUS AND
INDIGOLOG
The technical machinery we use to deﬁne program execu-
tion in the presence of sensing is based on that of [De Gia-
como and Levesque, 1999a, De Giacomo et al., 2000]. The
starting point in the deﬁnition is the situation calculus [Mc-
Carthy and Hayes, 1979]. We will not go over the lan-
guage here except to note the following components: there
is a special constant
￿
￿
￿ used to denote the initial situa-
tion, namely that situation in which no actions have yet oc-
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In this paper, we only deal explicitly with sensing actions
with binary outcomes as in [Levesque, 1996]. However,
the results presented here can be easily generalized to sen-
sors with multiple outcomes. To represent the information
provided by a sensing action, we use a predicate
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Within this language, we can formulate domain theories
which describe how the world changes as the result of the
available actions. One possibility is an action theory of the
following form [Reiter, 1991, 2001a]:
B Axioms describing the initial situation,
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B The following successor state axiom for the knowl-
edge ﬂuent
￿ [Scherl and Levesque, 1993]:
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B Unique names axioms for the primitive actions.
B Some foundational, domain independent ax-
ioms [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 1998, Reiter,
2001a].To describe a run which includes both actions and their
sensing results, we use the notion of a history, i.e., a se-
quence of pairs
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D is
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We also use
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of the situation calculus, the sensing results of a history,
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Next we turn to programs. The programs we consider here
are based on the ConGolog language deﬁned in [De Gia-
como et al.,2000]. This providesa rich setofprogramming
constructs summarized below:
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Among these constructs, we notice the presence of of non-
deterministic constructs. These include
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this paper.
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refer the reader to [De Giacomo et al., 2000] for a detailed
account of ConGolog.
In [De Giacomo et al., 2000], a single step transition se-
mantics in the style of [Plotkin, 1981] is deﬁned for Con-
Golog programs. Two special predicates
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Ofﬂine executions of programs, which are the kind of
executions originally proposed for Golog and ConGolog
[Levesque et al., 1997, De Giacomo et al., 2000], are char-
acterizedusingthe
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An ofﬂine execution of program
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￿ is a se-
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Observe that an ofﬂine executor is in fact similar to a plan-
ner that given a program, a starting situation, and a theory
describing the domain, produces a sequence of action to
execute in the environment. In doing this, it has no access
to sensing results, which will only be available at runtime.
See [De Giacomo et al., 2000] for more details.
In [De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999a], IndiGolog, an
extension of ConGolog that deals with online execu-
tions with sensing is developed. The semantics deﬁnes
an online execution of an IndiGolog program
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from a history
a , as a sequence of (online) conﬁgura-
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i.e., to single-step the program
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There is no automatic lookahead in IndiGolog. Instead,
a search operator
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￿ . Thus, with this deﬁnition, the axioms
entail that a step of the program can be performed pro-
vided that they entail that this step can be extended into
a complete execution (i.e., in all models). This prunes ex-
ecutions that are bound to fail later on. But it does not
guarantee that the executor will not get stuck in a situation
where it knows that some transition can be performed, but
does not know which. For example, consider the program
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ways possible, but where the agent does not know whether
￿ holds after
￿ . There are two possible ﬁrst steps,
￿ which
terminates successfully, and
￿ after which the executor is
stuck. Unfortunately,
† does not distinguish between the
two cases, since even in the latter, there does exist an (un-
known) transition to a ﬁnal state.
3 EPISTEMICALLY ACCURATE
THEORIES
In this paper we are going to look at theories that are epis-
temically accurate, meaning that what is known accurately
reﬂects what the theory says about the dynamic system.3
Formally,epistemicallyaccuratetheories are theoriesas in-
troduced earlier, but with two additional constraints:
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3In [Reiter, 2001b], a similar notion is used to deal with
knowledge-based programs, and reduce knowledge to provabil-
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does not appear, which describes the initial situation,
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￿ . Note that there can be ﬂuents about whichnothing
is known in the initial situation.
B There is an axiom stating that the accessibility rela-
tion
￿ is reﬂexivein theinitialsituation,whichisthen
propagated to all situations by the successor state ax-
iom for
￿ [Scherl and Levesque, 1993].
For epistemically accurate theories we have established the
following result:
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Proof Sketch:
» Follows trivially from the reﬂexivity of
￿ in the initial situation, and the fact that it is preserved by
the successor state axiom for
￿ .
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This means that if some objective property of the system is
entailed, then it is also known and vice-versa.4 DELIBERATION PROGRAM STEPS
We are going to introduce and semantically characterize
the deliberation steps in the program. The basic idea of
the semantics we are going to develop is that the task of
the deliberator (that performs search) is to try to ﬁnd a de-
terministic program that is guaranteed to be “executable”
and constitutes a way to execute the program provided, in
the sense that it always leads to terminating situations of
the given program. Another way to look at this is that the
deliberator tries to identify a “strategy” for reaching a ﬁ-
nal situation of the supplied program. In such a strategy,
all choices must be resolved, i.e., the corresponding pro-
gram needs to be deterministic, and only information that
is available to the executor is required. In doing this task,
the deliberator performs essentially the same task as the
ofﬂine executor: it compiles the original program into a
simpler program that can be executed without any looka-
head. The program it produces however, is not just a linear
sequence of actions; it can perform sensing, branching, it-
eration, etc. Moreover, the program is checked to ensure
that the executor will always have enough information to
continue the execution. Among other things, this addresses
the problem raised above concerning the original seman-
tics of search. Note that our approach is similar to that of
[Levesque, 1996]; however, there the strategy was stated in
a completely different language (robot programs), here we
use ConGolog, i.e., the language used to program the agent
itself.
4.1 EPISTEMICALLY FEASIBLE
DETERMINISTIC PROGRAMS
The ﬁrst step in developing this approach is formalizing
the notion mentioned above of a deterministic program for
which an executor will always have enough information to
continuetheexecution,i.e., willalways knowwhat thenext
step to be performed is. We capture this notion formally
by deﬁning the class of epistemically feasible deterministic
programs (
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ﬁgurations reachable from the initial program and situation
involve a locally epistemically feasible deterministic pro-
gram (
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unique transition (with or without an action) it can perform
next.
Observe that an epistemically feasible deterministic pro-
gram is not required to terminate. However,since the agent
is guaranteed to know what to do next at every step in its
execution, it follows that if it is entailed that the program
can reach a ﬁnal situation, then it can be successfully exe-
cuted online whatever the sensing outcomes may be:
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Proof Sketch: First of all we observe that
￿
z is a determin-
istic program and its possible online executions from
a are
completely determined by the sensing outcomes. We also
observe that in each model there will be a single execution
of
￿
z , since the sensing outcomes are fully determined in
the model.
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executions of
￿
z terminate in all models and these mod-
els cover all possible sensing outcomes, an online execu-
tion must either successfully terminate or get stuck in an
online conﬁguration where neither ﬁnal nor another transi-
tion is entailed. Suppose that there is such an online con-
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are distinct epistemic alternatives corresponding to these
different models and so the agent would not know what the
nexttransitionisinthismodel. Hence,eitherway,theagent
is not stuck in
￿
%
￿
z
^
L
￿
E
a
.
^
4
￿ , thus getting a contradiction.
» If an online execution of
￿
z from
a terminates it means
that the program
￿
z , from
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
J
3
a
J
: , terminates in all models
of
￿
D
~
;
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
ﬁ
￿
￿
￿
,
0
￿
￿
1
￿
￿
0
￿
￿
J
3
a
J
:
￿
￿ with the sensing outcomes as
in the online execution. Since by hypothesis all online ex-
ecutions terminate, thus covering all possible sensing out-
comes, then
￿
z , from
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
J
3
a
J
: , terminates in all models.4.2 SEMANTICS OF DELIBERATION STEPS
We nowgivethe formal semanticsofthe deliberationsteps.
To denote these steps in the program we introduce a delib-
eration operator
¨
¿
￿ , a new form of the IndiGolog search
operator discussed in Section 2.
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z no mat-
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executes it.4 Note that we do not need to put
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The following theorem shows that our semantics for the
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be relaxed when we address execution monitoring in Section 7.
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ing. Hence the thesis follows.
5 SYNTAX-BASED ACCOUNTS OF
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Ingeneral,deliberatingtoﬁndawaytoexecutea high-level
programcanbeveryhardbecauseitamountsto doingplan-
ning where the class of potential plans is very general. It
is thus natural to consider restricted classes of programs.
Two particularly interesting such classes are: (i) programs
that do not perform sensing, which correspond to confor-
mant plans5 (see e.g., [Smith and Weld, 1998]), and (ii)
programs that are guaranteed to terminate in a bounded
number of steps (i.e., do not involve any form of cycles),
which correspond to conditional plans (see e.g., [Smith
et al., 1998]). We will show that for these two classes, one
can restrict one’s attention to simple syntactically-deﬁned
classes of programs without loss of generality. So if for
instance, one is designing a deliberator/planner, one might
want to only consider programs from these classes.
5.1 TREE PROGRAMS
Letus nowdeﬁnethe classof(sense-branch)tree programs
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where
￿ is any non-sensing action, and
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￿
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tree programs.
This class includes conditional programs where one can
only test a condition that has just been sensed (or trivial
tests — these are introduced only for technical reasons).
Whenever such a program is executable, it is also epistem-
ically feasible — the agent always knows what to do next:
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Proof Sketch: By induction on the structure of
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5We remind the reader that conformant plans are sequences
of actions that, even under incomplete information about the do-
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ByTheorem2,wealsohavethatundertheconditionsofthe
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nating. The problem of ﬁnding a tree program that yields
an execution of a program in a deliberation block is the
analogue in our framework of conditional planning (under
incomplete information) in the standard setting [Peot and
Smith, 1992, Smith et al., 1998].
Next, we show that tree programs are sufﬁcient to express
any strategy where there is a known bound on the number
of steps it needs to terminate. That is, for any epistemi-
cally feasible deterministic program for which this condi-
tion holds, there is a tree program that produces the same
executions:
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Proof Sketch: We construct the tree program
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Since there are terminating online executions for all possi-
ble sensing outcomes, the thesis follows.
This theorem shows that if we restrict our attention to
`
<
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˜ s that terminate in a bounded number of steps, then
we can further restrict our attention to programs of a very
speciﬁc syntactic form, without any loss in generality. This
may simplify the task of coming up with a successful strat-
egy for a given deliberation block.
5.2 LINEAR PROGRAMS
Let the class of linear programs
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Thisclassonlyincludessequencesofactionsortrivialtests.
So whenever such a plan is executable, then it is also epis-
temically feasible — the agent always knows what to do
next:
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Proof Sketch: This is a corollary of Theorem 4 for tree pro-
grams. Since linear programs are tree programs, the thesis
follows immediately from this theorem.
By Theorem 2, we also have that under the conditions of
the above theorem, all online executionsof
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minating. Sincetheagentmayhaveincompleteknowledge,
the problem of ﬁnding a linear program that yields an exe-
cution of a program in a deliberation block is the analogue
in our framework of conformant planning in the standard
setting [Smith and Weld, 1998].
Next,we showthatlinearprogramsaresufﬁcienttoexpress
any strategy that does not perform sensing.
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Proof Sketch: We show this using the same approach as
for Theorem 5 for tree programs. Since
￿
z cannot con-
tain sensing actions, the construction method used in the
proof of Theorem 5 produces a tree program that contains
no branching and is in fact a linear program. Then, by the
same argument as used there, the thesis follows.
Observe that this implies that if no sensing is possible —
for instance, because there are no sensing actions — then
linear programs are sufﬁcient to express every strategy.
Let
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￿ be a deliberation operator that is axiomatized just
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￿ except that we replace the requirement that
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an epistemically feasible deterministic program by the re-
quirement that it be a linear program, i.e., where we use the
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This provides the basis for a simple implementation.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
Let us now examine how the deliberation construct can be
implemented according to the speciﬁcation given above,
i.e., by having the interpreter look for an epistemically fea-
sible deterministic program of a certain type, linear, tree,
etc. We also relate these implementations to earlier imple-
mentation proposals for IndiGolog.
The simplest type of implementation is one that only con-
siders linear programs as potential strategies for executing
the program in the deliberation block, as in the speciﬁca-
tion of
¨
˚
￿ above. This will work if there is a solution that
does not do sensing. Here is the code in Prolog:
/* implementation using linear programs */
trans(delib_l(P),H,DPL1,H1):-
buildLine(P,DPL,H), trans(DPL,H,DPL1,H1).
buildLine(P,[],H):- final(P,H).
buildLine(P,[(true)?|DPL],H):-
trans(P,H,P1,H), buildLine(P1,DPL,H).
buildLine(P,[A|DPL],H):- /* A is not */
trans(P,H,P1,[(A,1)|H]), /* a sensing */
buildLine(P1,DPL,[(A,1)|H]). /* action */
Instead of situations, this code uses histories, which are es-
sentiallylistsofpairsofactionsandsensingoutcomessince
the initial situation. The buildLine(P,DPL,H) predicate
basically looks for a sequence of transitions that the pro-
gram can perform and that that is guaranteed to lead to
a ﬁnal conﬁguration without performing sensing (sensing
outcomes for non-sensing actions are assumed to be 1).
This approach to implementing deliberation is essentially
that used in [De Giacomo et al., 1998, Lesp´ erance and Ng,
2000, De Giacomo et al., 2001], as these assumethat delib-
eration blocks do not contain sensing actions.
A more general type of implementation is one that con-
siders tree programs as potential strategies for executing
the program in the deliberation block, assuming that binary
sensing actions are available. This can be implemented by
generalizing the above as follows:
/* implementation using tree programs */
trans(delib_t(P),H,DPT1,H1):-
buildTree(P,DPT,H), trans(DPT,H,DPT1,H1).
buildTree(P,[],H):- final(P,H).
buildTree(P,[(true)?|DPT],H):-
trans(P,H,P1,H), buildTree(P1,DPT,H).
buildTree(P,[A,if(F,DPT1,DPT2)]):-
trans(P,H,P1,[(A,_)|H]), senses(A,F),
buildTree(P1,DPT1,[(A,1)|H]),
buildTree(P1,DPT2,[(A,0)|H]).
buildTree(P,[A|DPT],H):-
trans(P,H,P1,[(A,_)|H]), not senses(A,_),
buildTree(P1,DPT,[(A,1)|H]).
buildTree(P,(false)?,H):- inconsistent(H).
inconsistent([(A,1)|H]):- inconsistent(H) ;
senses(A,F), holds(neg(F),H).
inconsistent([(A,0)|H]):- inconsistent(H) ;
senses(A,F), holds(F,H).
A transition is performed on a program search t(p) only
if it is always possible to extend it into a complete execu-
tion of p. To ensure this, whenever a binary sensing ac-
tion is encountered, the code veriﬁes the existence of com-
plete executions for both potential sensing outcomes 0 and
1 (3rd clause of buildTree). For non-sensing actions, the
sensing outcome is assumed to be 1, and the existence of
an execution is veriﬁed in this single case (4th clause of
buildTree). This implementation is similar to that of
[De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999a]. Both of the above
implementations are sound but not complete.6
6The incompleteness comes from the fact that they stick to
the form of the program while the semantics does not. One ex-
ample that brings this out is:
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is a strategy for executing it, but the implemen-
tations fail to ﬁnd it.7 DELIBERATION WITH EXECUTION
MONITORING
So far, we have provided a formal account of plans that are
suitable for an agent capable of sensing the environment
during the execution of a high-level program. We have not
addressed, though, another important feature of complex
environments with which a realistic agent needs to cope as
well: exogenous actions. Intuitively, an exogenous action
is an action outside the control of the agent, perhaps a nat-
ural event or an action performed by another agent. Tech-
nically, these are primitive actions that may occur without
being part of the user-speciﬁed program. It is not hard to
imagine how one would slightly alter the deﬁnition of on-
line execution of Section 2 so as to allow for the occurrence
of exogenous actions after each legal transition. Nonethe-
less, an exogenous action can potentially compromise the
online execution of a deliberation block. This is due to
the fact that
¨
¿
￿ commits to a particular EFDP which can
turn out to be impossible to execute after the occurrence of
some interfering outside action. If there is another EFDP
that could be used instead to complete the execution of the
deliberation block, we would like the agent to switch to it.
To address this problem, the search operator deﬁned in
[Lesp´ eranceand Ng, 2000]implements an executionmoni-
toring mechanism. The idea is to recompute a search block
wheneverthecurrentplanhasbecomeinvalidduetotheoc-
currence of exogenous actions during the incremental exe-
cution. The new search starts from the original program
and situation (this is important because often commitments
are made early on in the program’s execution, and these
may have to be revised when an exogenous change occurs)
and ensures that the plan produced is compatible with the
already performed actions.
Based on [De Giacomo et al., 1998], one can come up with
a clean and abstract formalization of execution monitoring
andreplanningforour epistemicversionofdeliberationde-
scribed in Section 4.2. The idea is to avoid permanently
committing to a particular EFDP. Instead, we deﬁne a de-
liberation operator
¨
￿
￿
￿ that monitors the execution of the
selected EFDP and replans when necessary, possibly se-
lecting an alternative EFDP to follow. The semantics of
this monitored deliberation construct goes as follows:
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The main difference is in the remaining program which
contains not only the epistemically feasible strategy cho-
sen, but also the original program
z , original situation
￿ ,
andnextexpectedsituation
￿
5
￿ . Thesecomponentsarepack-
aged using a new language construct
￿
S
￿
￿ , which basically
means that the agent should monitor the execution of the
selected strategy
￿
z using the original program and situa-
tion to replan when necessary.
The next step, then, is to deﬁne the semantics for the
new “monitoring” construct
￿
S
￿
￿ . With that objec-
tive, we ﬁrst introduce two auxiliary relations. Relation
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￿ states whether the strat-
egy
￿
z has just been perturbed in situation
￿ by some ex-
ogenous action. There are obviouslyseveral ways to deﬁne
when a strategy has been perturbed. A sensible one is the
following: a strategy has been perturbed if the exogenous
actions that just occurred rule out a successful execution
for both the strategy and the original program of the delib-
eration block.
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Notice that we make use of the special program
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, see [De Giacomo et al., 2000], to
allow for a legal sequence of exogenous actions. Also, ob-
serve that a strategy can be perturbed only if an action out-
side the strategy occurred, in which case the actual situa-
tion
￿ would differ from the expected situation
￿
￿
￿ . Thus in
practice, there is no need to check for perturbation unless
an exogenous action or an action other than that performed
by the chosen strategy occurs.
The next auxiliary relation is used to calculate a recovered
strategy
￿
z
J
￿ when the current one
￿
z was perturbed in sit-
uation
￿ . A sensible deﬁnition for it is:
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Observe that the above deﬁnition may end up choosing an
alternativeepistemicallyfeasiblestrategy thantheonecho-
sen before. In a nutshell, a new recovered strategy is an
epistemically feasible one that is able to “solve” the origi-
nal program
z
^ while accounting for every action executed
so far, either by the deliberation block or not, since the be-
ginning of the deliberation block.
We nowhaveall themachineryneededtodeﬁnetheseman-
tics for the monitoring construct
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￿ , we have two possibilities: (i) if the strategy
has not been perturbed, then we continue its execution by
performing one step and updating the next expected situa-
tion; (ii) if the strategy has just been perturbed, a recovered
new strategy
￿
z
￿ is computed and the execution continues
with respect to this alternative strategy. It is important to
note that the original programand situation are always kept
throughout the whole execution of a deliberation block. In
that way, the recovery process can be as general as pos-
sible. The case for
+
o
~
W
￿
￿
￿
]
￿ is simpler: (i) if the strategy
has not been perturbed, then we check whether the strategy
is ﬁnal in the actual situation; (ii) if the strategy has been
perturbed, then there is a chance that the original program
might be terminating in the current situation and we check
for this.
Summarizing, deliberation can be naturally integrated with
execution monitoring in order to cope with exogenous ac-
tions that make the chosen strategy unsuitable.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed an account of the kind of de-
liberation that an agent that is doing planning or executing
high-level programs must be able to perform. The deliber-
ator’s job is to produce a kind of plan that does not itself
require deliberation to interpret. We characterized these
as epistemically feasible programs: programs for which
the executing agent, at every stage of execution, by virtue
of what it knew initially and the subsequent readings of
its sensors, always knows what step to take next towards
the goal of completing the entire program. We formalized
this notion and characterized deliberation in the IndiGolog
agent language in terms of it. We have also shown that
for certain classes of problems, which correspond to con-
formant planning and conditional planning, the search for
epistemicallyfeasible programs can be limited to programs
of a simple syntactic form.
There has been a lot of work in the past on formalizing the
notion of epistemically feasible plan, e.g. Moore [1985],
Davis [1994], Lesp´ erance et al. [2000], Levesque [1996],
and our accounts builds on this. One its distinguishing
features is that it is integrated with the transition system
semantics of our programming language. In Lesp´ erance
[2001], a similar approach is used to formalize a notion of
epistemic feasibility for multiagent system speciﬁcations.
In McIlraith and Son [2001], a notion of “self-sufﬁcient
program” very similar to
`
<
￿
f
ˆ
 
˜ s is formalized; but this
account is more sensitive to the syntax of the program than
ours.
In this paper, we have only dealt with binary sensing ac-
tions. However, the account of deliberation developed in
Section 4 and its extension to provide execution monitor-
ing in Section 7 do not rely on this restriction and apply
unchanged to theories with sensing actions that have even
an inﬁnite number of possible sensing outcomes.7 This
comes from the fact that our characterization of “good exe-
cution strategies” through the notion of
`
<
￿
f
ˆ
ﬁ
˜ is not syn-
tactic, only requiring the agent to know what action to
do next at every step. The results of Section 5.1 show-
ing that tree programs are sufﬁcient to solve any plan-
ning/deliberationproblemwherethere issome strategythat
solves the problem in a bounded number of steps also
generalize to domains involving sensing actions with non-
binary but ﬁnitely many outcomes; this is easy to see given
that any such sensing action can be encoded as a sequence
binary sensing actions that read the outcome one bit at a
time (one could of course extend the class of tree programs
with a non-binary branching structure to avoid the need for
such an encoding). Whether a similar characterization can
be obtained for sensing actions with an inﬁnite number of
possible outcomes is an open problem. While the above
holds in principle, as soon as the number of sensing out-
comes is more than a few, conditional planning becomes
impracticalwithoutadvicefromthe programmeras to what
conditions the plan should branch on [Lakemeyer, 1999,
Thielscher, 2001]. In [Sardi˜ na, 2001], a search construct
for IndiGolog that generates conditional plans involving
non-binary sensing actions by relying on such programmer
advice is developed. This approach seems very compatible
with ours and it would be interesting to formalize it as a
special case of our account of deliberation. There are also
more general theories of sensing, such as that of [De Gia-
como and Levesque, 1999b] which deals with online sen-
sors that always provide values and situations where the
law of inertia is not always applicable. In [De Giacomo
et al., 2001], a search operator for such theories is devel-
oped. It would be worthwhile examining whether this set-
ting could also be handled within our account of delibera-
tion. Aswell,onecouldlookforsyntacticcharacterizations
for certain classes of epistemically feasible deterministic
7One can introduce non-binary sensing actions in our frame-
work as in [Scherl and Levesque, 1993].programs in this setting.
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